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Understanding complicity: Memory, hope and the imagination  
Mihaela Mihai, Politics and IR, University of Edinburgh, UK 
 
Abstract 
This paper addresses the thorny issue of complicity with wrongdoing under conditions of 
systemic political violence, such as authoritarianism, totalitarianism or military occupation. The 
challenge of dealing with collaborators – those who colluded with the apparatus of repression 
or who benefitted from its existence – is central to subsequent processes of justice and memory-
making. This paper proposes several arguments. Firstly, it claims we need to think about 
complicity and resistance not dichotomically, but as a continuum of locations individuals can 
occupy. Secondly, these locations are influenced by the agents’ positionality within the social 
world, each agent being situated at the intersection of several axes of distinction: class, gender, 
racialisation, and religion, among others. Thirdly, to understand complicity we also need to 
draw a connection between individual’s experience of time and their actions: temporality is 
experienced from within a social position, through the interplay between memory, imagination 
and hope. Positionality thus affects one’s memories and self-understanding, the scope of one’s 
imagination, as well as the type and intensity of one’s hopes. Therefore, individuals’ capacity 
to build on the past to imagine a future, to invest emotionally in the future and act accordingly 
are interrelated aspects of their experience, which will influence how they navigate the muddy 
waters of systemic wrongdoing, more or less complicitly. To give concreteness to these three 
theoretical arguments, the paper discusses several forms of complicity with violence during the 
Vichy Regime in France. 
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Introduction 
This paper addresses the thorny issue of complicity with wrongdoing under conditions of 
systemic political repression, such as authoritarianism, totalitarianism or military occupation. 
The challenge of dealing with collaborators – those who colluded with the apparatus of 
repression or who benefitted from its existence – is central to subsequent processes of justice 
and memory-making. France’s purges of Vichy supporters or the lustration laws unmasking 
secret police informers in Eastern Europe after 1989 are just two examples of official attempts 
to illuminate the ‘grey zone’ beyond the victim-perpetrator binary. This paper proposes several 
arguments. Firstly, it claims we need to think about complicity and resistance not 
dichotomically, but as a continuum of positions individuals can occupy. Secondly, these 
positions can only be accounted for by reflecting on agents’ positionality within the social 
world, each agent being located at the intersection of several axes of distinction, such as class, 
gender, racialisation, or religion. These axes make possible different forms of intersubjective 
relationality. Third, to account for complicity we need to account for the temporal nature of 
human beings: temporality is experienced from within a social position, through the interplay 
between memory, imagination and hope. Positionality affects one’s memories and self-
understanding, the scope of one’s imagination, as well as the nature and intensity of one’s 
hopes. Individuals’ sense of time, their capacity to build on the past to imagine a future and to 
invest emotionally in that future are interrelated aspects of their socially embedded experience, 
which have repercussions on how they act and navigate the muddy waters of systemic 
wrongdoing, in more or less complicit ways. 
The first section reviews existing theories of complicity, criticising the dominant moral-
legal philosophical account. The second section invites us to calibrate our assessments of 
practices of complicity by considering the relationship between positionality and one’s 
temporal horizon of expectations and hopes, as well as the socially situated reach of one’s 
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imagination, given the fragility of trust and the uncertainty of the future under repressive 
circumstances. The third section substantiates these theoretical claims by sketching three forms 
of complicity in Vichy France. 
Before delving in the argument, one clarification. This is a critical-hermeneutical 
exercise, reflecting on how we need to think about complicity. The aim is to invite the scholar 
of complicity to embrace a broader perspective on a complex, slippery phenomenon, with a 
view to imagining a different political future. Thus, the paper is not motivated by a search for 
the guilty, but by the challenge of taking political responsibility for the future, given the 
unsavoury past and given that most people are not heroes. It is with the non-heroes that this 
paper concerns itself: with how they responded and positioned themselves in relation to human 
rights violations, from within their own social island and temporal horizon. This exercise is 
crucial for understanding how we can collectively prevent the emergence of socio-political 
conditions of systemic violence and, should we fail, how we can stimulate habits of solidarity 
with its victims. 
 
Complicity/resistance: From dyad to continuum 
Complicity as a concept makes the object of two – relatively isolated – literatures. On the one 
hand, ample conceptual work focuses on levels of human responsibility for injustice in moral 
and legal philosophy. On the other hand, political theorists have reflected on the structural 
circumstances within which uncoordinated yet mutually reinforcing acts of complicity take 
place unimpeded. This paper leans towards the structural perspectives, shying away from the 
individualism and intransigent moralism of legal and moral philosophers. It does not, however, 
fall prey to structural reductionism: just as there is no perfectly unencumbered agency, no order 
is ever so totalising as to annihilate all resistance. Acknowledging the constraining force of 
institutions, forms of sociality and power constellations over individuals, it contributes to the 
literature by problematising the relationship between complicity on the one hand, and temporal 
expectations, imagination and hope, on the other. To outline my contribution, I now turn to a 
critical engagement with these two existing bodies of work. 
Moral and legal philosophy converge in their aim to provide a universal set of sharp 
analytical tools for differentiating between different levels of individual complicity in 
wrongdoing, thereby enabling legal reasoning and ascription of moral guilt.i Philosophers 
disagree about the conditions for counting somebody complicit: debates focus on the type and 
role of intent, the existence of a causal contribution, the degree of autonomy necessary, among 
others.ii Depending on one’s level of involvement, complicity covers connivance, contiguity, 
collusion, collaboration, condoning, consorting, conspiring, and full joint wrongdoing.iii These 
precise, distinct categories can illuminate the many faces occupying the grey zone for the 
purpose of legal accountability, according to the wrongdoer’s relative degree of 
blameworthiness. Moreover, they help identify those instances when individuals cannot be held 
legally liable.  
Thus deployed, methodological individualism produces a sophisticated account of 
complicity. However, because of the collapse of moral (and political) philosophy into legal 
reasoning, this literature embraces a rather simplistic notion of subjectivity and agency.iv The 
criminal law paradigm colonises the imagination of the moral-political philosopher, whose 
object of study exceeds criminal law’s blunt categories. This paper proposes to understand 
complicity as always enmeshed in complex social relations and influenced – though not fully 
determined – by one’s location within those relations, as well as the temporal horizons opened 
by that location. While useful for ascertaining legal liability, moral-legal philosophical frames 
fail to capture diffuse, temporally enduring patterns of often unconscious complicity. To 
understand this complexity – in general and under circumstances of political repression – we 
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need to leave behind the philosopher’s and lawyer’s ceteris paribus and explore the temporal, 
positional and relational nature of human subjectivity.v  
First, complicity is mediated by power structures that normalise wrongdoing and render 
complicity invisible. Moral-legal philosophers focus on obvious, discrete, and intentional 
individual acts of implication in wrongdoing. The purpose is to determine the level of 
blameworthiness and/or the existing legal category under which to subsume such acts. They are 
not preoccupied with routinised, often unreflective, patterns of complicity or series of 
complicitous acts in temporally stable, structural violence.  
Social and political theorists are more sensitive to how power relations shape both the 
contexts and the agents of wrongdoing. Mobilising historical and sociological knowledge, they 
give preponderant weight to the social, legal, political and cultural background against which 
practices and patterns (rather than acts) of complicity emerge, in often uncoordinated but 
mutually reinforcing fashion.vi Reflection on the historical conditions that render abuses against 
certain groups habitual and permissible, part of the everyday repertoire of social interaction, 
paves the way for explaining first, how violations often go on unhindered for long periodsvii 
and second, why official mechanisms of redress are frequently met with societal resistance. The 
absence of reflection on facilitating conditions makes the moral-legal perspective only 
surgically effective – rather than politically transformative. 
Therefore, second, we need a more sophisticated understanding of agency and 
subjectification to replace the highly individualised and temporally circumscribed account of 
intent. Moral-legal philosophers do not assume accomplices are persons with a history, 
occupying a certain position within the hierarchy of human worth that a society is structured by 
at a certain moment in time.viii They work with a time slice that begins just before the 
commission of a wrong act and ends after its completion. The ways in which processes of 
subject constitution inform an actor’s behaviour do not enter moral-legal philosophers’ 
reasoning. Consequently, the individual’s subjectification through the internalisation of certain 
ideas about the social world which she helps reproduce – the coordinates of her positionality – 
is left out from standard accounts of complicity. 
Thirdly and relatedly, most moral-legal philosophers assume the subject is essentially 
rational and transparent to herself and that different levels of intent – from full intent, to 
encouragement and ratification – can be parsed out easily.ix This paper argues that any attempt 
to redress wrongs and think politically (rather than merely legally) about the future must rely 
on a moderately sceptical account of the possibility of reflexivity in the face of violence. The 
analysis of the social, political and cultural context can help us understand that collaborators, 
beneficiaries of violence and bystanders often have mixed motives for action, that long-term, 
indifferent collective passivity elides reflexive intent, and that the effects of complicity are often 
ambiguous and difficult to isolate.  
Fourth, this paper argues that complicity is a matter of degree, not one of dichotomic 
choice. The ‘moral purity/legal innocence versus unambiguous guilt’ paradigm does not capture 
the myriad of positions one can occupy on a temporally dynamic continuum between complicity 
and resistance.x Where an individual finds herself on this continuum is a function of her social 
position, which influences – but never fully determines – the horizon of expectations regarding 
her own agency and the others’, the type of sociality she inhabits, her level of social trust, the 
scope of her political imagination, as well as the content and intensity of her hopes and fears. 
Most importantly, this position is not fixed, but changes over time, reflecting changes in both 
the context and the agent herself.xi 
To sum up, any evaluation of complicity must recognise individuals as socially 
embedded, located within a temporally and intersubjectively experienced social world, with 
which, in a deep sense, they are inescapably complicit.xii This embeddedness influences their 
participation in more or less complicit practices and patterns of behaviour, in ways that can 
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only be partially captured by the moral-legal paradigm.xiii In what follows, I focus on the 
relationship between positionality – which is always relational – and complicity, via a 
discussion of other interrelated aspects of individuals’ socio-temporal experience: memory, 
imagination, hope. 
 
Situated complicity: memory, imagination, hope  
As temporal creatures, with sophisticated cognitive abilities to understand ourselves and others 
as temporally enduring beings (Calhoun 2008), we build on past experiences – captured in our 
memories – to project ourselves in a hoped-for future, which we know to be uncertain and not 
fully within our control. The faculty of the imagination intervenes in the twin process of 
building a coherent narrative of our past (Keightley and Pickering 2012) and of experimenting 
with strategies and potential trajectories into the future we hope for (Bovens 1999). Thus, hope 
mediates our relationship with our future, in light of our past, though not straightforwardly or 
manifestly. In hoping, we explore imaginatively what we might achieve through our actions, 
notwithstanding our limitations, our fears and the negative evidence available.xiv  
We continue to have hopes for as long as we believe in the possibility of a future (Fletcher 
1999): hope provides us with ‘a sturdy enough bridge to the future in this life.’ (Urban Walker 
2006, pp. 40–41)xv When we fail, the imagination helps us refocus our hopes on alternative 
objects. These processes of orientation to the future do not happen in a vacuum: hope is always 
situated. I have already pointed to how memory influences hope, both in terms of the objects it 
latches on and its intensity. Memories are themselves underpinned by ongoing processes of 
intersubjective self-constitution, which influence the kind and range of objects the imagination 
conjures in hoping. Our social embeddedness impacts the scope of our imagination, i.e. the type 
of things we fear and hope for. Therefore, visions of the future will be informed by past 
experiences that constitute the self, by the types of sociality it encounters and cultivates, the 
norms constituting it and the levels of social trust it enjoys: situated memory and experience 
provide the imagination with an anchorage and delimit the content and strength of our hopes.xvi  
Depending on what future we can imaginatively project ourselves into, we act differently 
in relation to personal and political goals. Both psychological (Snyder 2002, Miceli and 
Castelfranchi 2010) and philosophical texts (Downie 1963, Bovens 1999, McGeer 2004, 2008, 
Pettit 2004, Calhoun 2008, Meirav 2009) have highlighted the effect hope has on the assessment 
of one’s agency in relation to one’s future. Hope can kindle our trust in our own capacities to 
achieve our goals – whatever they might be – even when the odds are measly (Pettit 2004, 
Urban Walker 2006). They can mobilise our attention, emotional and rational faculties, pushing 
us to devise effective, flexible strategies. Hope fortifies and sustains us through adversity, 
fuelling our resilience and ability to act, sharpening perceptions and helping us adjust our plans 
in response to obstacles. The pleasure we get from imaginatively anticipating the hoped-for 
state of affairs energises us when facing set-backs (Bovens 1999). 
Hope does not have this effect on agency only self-referentially: our hopes about others 
can facilitate their engaging in actions that can contribute to success. Our hopes about others’ 
actions encourage and sustain them in their endeavour to live up to our expectations. Thus, our 
hope provides a scaffold for their actions (McGeer 2008). Conversely, their hopes about us 
sustain us. Because of this dynamising tendency, hope feeds trust and solidarity. There is a 
strong connection between hope and the very possibility of collective action (Pettit 2004), 
whatever its goals. This connection has important repercussions wherever individuals and 
groups position themselves politically on the complicity-resistance spectrum in the contexts of 
interest to this paper. 
However, to thrive, hope needs a responsive world that at least partially supports our 
efforts (McGeer 2004). Otherwise, its dynamic tendencies fail to nurture individuals’ and 
collectives’ agency. In hoping, we take ‘an agential interest in the world’ (McGeer 2008, p. 
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246) in our own – but also others’ – future. Losing hope can be dramatic – through war, famine 
and genocide – or gradual, through the slow erosion of the capacity to imagine a future – 
through resilient poverty, social marginalisation, or encroaching dehumanization.xvii When a 
future is not imaginable, whether because of physical or social death, hope has no place: ‘To 
find oneself utterly unable to imagine a desirable, possible future, is to lose the basis for taking 
an interest in one’s own agency.’ (Calhoun 2008, p. 29)  
How does this all bear on the issue of complicity with systematic wrongdoing? I have so 
far argued that, to comprehend the complex dynamics of complicity, we must account for the 
agent’s social and temporal positionality, a function of processes of subjectification that 
influence her experiences and their sedimentation in memory, her hopes for the future and the 
role she ascribes to her own agency in bringing about that future. Under circumstances of 
political repression, visions of the future will vary in their hopefulness, but all will be affected 
by the historical context, some in enabling, others in constraining ways. No context is 
experienced uniformly. In what follows, I sketch a few points on the relationship between 
memory, imagination, hope and agency for several positions on the spectrum of involvement.  
For willing collaborators – informers, propagandists or délateursxviii – the future looks 
promising as various hoped-for benefits feed their moral disengagement from the victims. 
Ideological commitment ranges from zealotry to mere opportunism, depending on past political 
experience, socio-economic status and one’s immediate community: political views, religious 
beliefs, personal ambition or greed animate their hopes and the actions they undertake in their 
pursuit. Physical and economic safety, career boosts, access to scarce material goods, a higher 
life quality are just some of the benefits derived from willing collaboration.xix  
For by-standers who do not directly collaborate, various futures are imaginable, 
depending on their social capital, access to resources, prior political engagement, the sense of 
their own agency and capacity to navigate circumstances, as well as the availability of 
opportunities to maintain or form new relationships of trust.xx Some navigate along the 
continuum, becoming collaborators or even perpetrators, especially if they share – more or less 
consciously – the repressive regime’s ideology. One could simultaneously be a by-stander in 
one area of social interaction, and a resister or a collaborator in another. During long periods of 
intense political violence, in the absence of a credible temporal horizon for change, bystanders 
become collaborators to fulfil some personal or professional hopes. Under such circumstances, 
solidarity in resistance remains improbable. To understand everyday life in totalitarian Romania 
(1945–1989), Pârvulescu (2015) asks us to ‘borrow the psyche of someone who knows that it 
is highly likely that her entire life will go like this, moment by moment and year by year, till 
the end. And that, after her death, the life of her own children will also be, moment by moment, 
and year by year, like this.’ In a stable climate of fear, refusing all compromises requires a 
doubly heroic attitude of courage and endurance.  
Consequently, many remain passively compliant, muddling through everyday hardships. 
Attentisme (Rousso 1997) – waiting to see how things develop before occupying the most 
advantageous position – is often initially embraced. As change becomes unimaginable, people 
adjust their hopes and actions to the situationxxi: hope sometimes attaches to a future that does 
not get worse, while the imagination fails to conjure a vision of solidarity with victims. And 
since societal wrongs grow in communities that tolerate them, adjustment and accommodation 
feed repression.  
Avoiding complicity need not require irrational or heroic hopes. In a climate of terror and 
generalised suspicion, individuals tend to anxiously exaggerate the danger triggered by modest 
– yet crucial – resistances, short of armed struggle and sabotage. This is not to say that risks are 
always overestimated, but only to point out that passively standing by cannot always be justified 
by invoking risks to oneself.xxii  
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Some by-standers slide towards the other end of the spectrum, resistance. Resistance can 
be motivated by various hopes, whose objects translate personal, political or ethical 
commitments, all of which, however, are inextricably related – more or less directly – to an 
orientation towards the political world. Resistance ranges from armed struggle and sabotage to 
protest, clandestine publishing, refusals to collaborate, pay taxes and obey laws. Madres de 
Plaza de Mayo marched against the Argentine juntas in the hope of burying their disappeared 
children, the French maquis fought for national sovereignty, communist idealsxxiii and 
redeeming French masculinity, while intellectual dissidents worldwide invoke the harm silence 
inflicts on their integrity.xxiv Just like complicity, different forms of resistance correspond to 
different positionalities within a community’s lifeworld, influenced by structures such as 
gender, class, profession and religion.  
Which brings us to the intersubjective dimension of hoping, imagining and acting. A 
responsive social world is a precondition for hope and ‘…shared hopes become collective when 
individuals see themselves as hoping and so acting in concert for ends that they communally 
endorse.’ (McGeer 2004, p. 125) This is valid for both wrongdoing and resistance against 
wrongdoing. As will emerge from the case study, perpetrators and collaborators offer each other 
the necessary scaffolding for their hopes, mobilising to act more efficiently in pursuit of their 
vision. On the other hand, while no two repressive regimes are alike, social trust is eroded. Fear 
of violent reprisals for dissent, anxieties about potential betrayal and general hardships usually 
have an atomising effect.xxv The social scaffolding that hopes for a different future need to 
flourish is often unavailable. The opportunities for solidarity – which depend on cultivating 
hope in others’ capacity to act in concert – are diminished, and with them the possibility of 
effective resistance. Invoking the earlier examples, without the mutual support that their shared 
hope made possible, the Argentine Mothers may have caved in. Without the Allies’ aid, the 
moral and concrete support by local populations or communist comrades, the Maquis would 
not have contributed to the France’s liberation. Without friends’ and families’ trust and faith, 
many dissidents would not have found the strength to sustain their struggle.xxvi  
To substantiate these theoretical ideas about complicity, I analyse certain complicitous 
practices in relation to time, positionality, relationality, memory and hope in a complex context 
of collaboration: France under the German Occupation (1940–1944). The last section does not 
provide an exhaustive account of collaboration, only a discussion of three forms thereof, 
highlighting the socially embedded nature of action. 
 
Complicity during the ‘Black Years’ 
France was partially, then fully occupied by Germany between 1940 – 1944. This section 
analyses three forms of complicity: collaborationism, seeking employment with repressive 
institutions and denunciations. My analysis is organised around the temporal and structural 
(legal, economic, ideological, gendered and religious) vectors that frame the French 
population’s response to the occupation.  
Temporally, several elements need mentioning. The painful memory of WWI – which 
killed almost 1.5 million Frenchmen – made pacifism widespread before 1939. (Rousso 1992) 
Pacifism paradoxically motivated various collaborators, who hoped for an enduring 
reconciliation between France and Germany (Joly 2011, p. 14). La drôle de guerre – the short, 
quiet period between September 1939 and May 1940 – blunted the spirits and made the shock 
of the defeat worse. Following the defeat, everyday pressures and relief that ‘the war was over’ 
made most people acquiescent supporters of Vichy, incapable of imagining a way out (Diamond 
1999, p. 72). Finally, 1942 brought a major shift in French people’s horizon of hope as it marked 
both the occupation of France’s entire territory and the moment Germany’s defeat became 
imaginable. These temporal vectors affected the scope of individuals’ imagination and the 
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courage of their aspirations, as well as the relationships they entertained and the practices they 
participated in to pursue their goals. 
Several structures framed individuals’ locations on the spectrum of involvement: gender, 
socio-economic and professional profile, anti-Semitism, religion, the split ideological horizon 
that predated the war, the political memory of WWI, and the laws and policies passed by Vichy 
and the Occupier. As I show below, these temporally dynamic structures incited, elicited, 
inspired or facilitated various forms of collaboration that cannot be reduced to discrete, 
intentional, fully reflexive acts.  
Immediately after the defeat, Pétain launched the doctrine of ‘state collaboration’ with 
Germany, kick-starting the ‘National Revolution’ in the free zone: a fascist cultural revolution 
replacing ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity’ with ‘Work, Family, Motherland.’ ‘Motherland’ 
excluded ‘groups that, due to their ‘race’ or convictions, could not or would not subscribe to 
the primacy of the French nation: foreigners, Jews, masons, communists, internationalists of all 
origins and loyalties’ (R. Gillouin cited in Rousso 1992, my translation). Anti-Semitic laws 
were passed, mostly (not exclusively) by the Occupier, unequivocally tapping in a history of 
French anti-Semitism (Joly 2006, 2007b, 2012b, 2015, Joly and Passera 2016).xxvii In adopting 
administrative and economic collaborationism and embracing the Occupier’s cause, Pétain 
hoped to maintain French sovereignty.  
The first form of complicity, collaborationism, was rare. Few individuals were true 
collaborationists,xxviii or collabos, supporting the institutionalisation of anti-Semitism without 
scruples (Joly 2011): Jacques Doriot’s Le parti populaire français, Marcel Déat’s 
Rassemblement National Populaire and Eugène Deloncle’s Mouvement social révolutionnaire 
were virulent vehicles for anti-Semitic, anti-Communist and anti-Masonic propaganda, tapping 
into a history of extreme right politics and militarism. They printed newspapers – Le Francisme, 
Le cri du people and Au pilori. Intellectuals were not immune: some collaborated out of interest 
or conviction, promoting racist propaganda (Joly 2011). Thus, Le Groupe Collaboration 
assembled writers, scientists, clerics, artists aspiring to get famous, while the newly-founded 
Institute for the Study of Jewish Questions organised the anti-Semitic exhibition ‘The Jew and 
France’: 200,000 French citizens, including pupils, paid the entry ticket in 1941 (Rousso 1992, 
p. 98). These institutions provided the necessary scaffolding for collabos’ collective 
contribution to the Occupier’s mission. 
Moving along the spectrum, we find those who applied for jobs within the repressive state 
apparatus, an important target of post-war purges: the milice (the 80,000-strong institution that 
transformed Vichy into a police-state) and the General Commissariat for Jewish Questions 
(controlling Jewish persons and the spoliation of their property). ‘Economic aryanisation’ 
required an army of clerks (Bruttmann 2013). Two categories of employees emerge from the 
archives. First, those recommended by personal contacts in Vichy’s bureaucracy. One’s 
political connections and belonging to certain political and professional networks – one’s 
relational positionality – framed one’s image of professional success and the means for 
achieving it:  working as a public servant. The second category is the ‘bureaucratic proletariat’ 
developing after 1940, stuck on temporary, underpaid jobs: secretaries, accountants, office 
personnel of businesses and publications discontinued after 1940. Many applied to the 
commissariat – seen as an ordinary institution – to secure financial stability (Joly 2016). Thus, 
a different positionality, of economic vulnerability, pushed especially older unemployed and 
underqualified men and women – some of them war refugees or repatriated POWs – to  apply 
for salaries above average before 1942. (2016, p. 170) The number of fervent anti-Semites 
among the applicants was low, around 10%.xxix After 1942, the change in public opinion, the 
general hope in an Allied victory, budgetary cuts as well as a dramatic decrease in 
unemployment, led to a recruitment crisis. The commissariat started hiring unqualified 
personnel, even with criminal records (2016, p. 172).  
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Women too joined anti-Semitic organisations and repressive institutions (including la 
milice) for political, religious, economic and personal reasons. Imagined political futures 
animated some miliciennes: a ‘new French order, national and socialist’ made an ideologically 
zealous young woman join the milice as ‘the only guarantor of the French order, the only hope 
for a brighter future,’  for which she was ready ‘to dedicate all her forces’ (Simonin 2010, p. 
19). In general, however, women’s political hopes and the scope of their imagination was 
filtered through the matrix of gender, but also that of Catholicism. The post-WWI pacifism 
mentioned above pushed them to join the milice: ‘the end of all wars between France and 
Germany’ rendered collaboration natural. Religious duties of charity – often combined with 
maréchalisme (attachment to Pétain’s heroic past and fatherly image) – were yet another factor. 
Building on a tradition of ‘social citizenship’ going back at least to WWI, Catholic women 
joined repressive institutions to do social work for the wounded or the displaced, thus 
simultaneously adhering to their Catholic faith and serving Pétain (Fageot 2008). They became 
‘universal mothers’ (Simonin 2010, p. 22). Gendered notions of work and citizenship informed 
their positioning on the complicity spectrum: their collaboration perversely enfranchised them, 
fuelling emancipatory hopes for public engagement, at a time when they could not vote.  
Regarding their socio-economic status, statistics show la milicienne is a young, single, 
economically vulnerable woman with limited education, a secretary, dactylographer, or 
telephone operator.xxx The socio-professional status determines women’s economic options, 
whose precarious situation is often manipulated. For example, Déat’s RNP recruited many 
women by promising to help bring back family members who were POWs.  
These examples highlight gender, class and religion as important structures of the war 
experiences and their role in shaping the hopes and relations one could cultivate. Illuminating 
the structural factors is not meant to exculpate these applicants. Many were favourable to the 
agenda of the Vichy regime. Archives do show, however, that few were rabid anti-Semites: for 
most, economic gain came before ideology (Joly 2016, pp. 183–184).  
Anti-Semitic legislation served as a propitious framework for a third, insidious form of 
collaboration: uncoordinated denunciations of Jews, communists, freemasons to the French 
police, the Gestapo or the General Commissariat for Jewish Questions (délations). The anti-
Semitic press had dedicated rubrics for délations. The practice went back to the 19th Century: 
Édouard Drumont’s newspaper La Libre Parole, launched in 1892, contained ‘revelations’ 
about Jewish interference in French affairs – a clear precursor to the practices of the 1940s (Joly 
2007c). Revealing this lineage simultaneously highlights the role of institutional and political 
memory in shaping patterns of behaviour, and the limits of the individualistic, act-based 
paradigm. Most délations – oral or written, signed or anonymous – were motivated by personal 
reasons: a neighbourly conflict, jealousy, greed,xxxi bitterness and frustration linked to 
deprivation, a professional rivalry, excessive respect for the law, or duress (Joly 2013), always 
tainted by anti-Semitism – visceral or circumstantial, militant and cultivated or rough, 
normalised by legislation and the general atmosphere (Joly 2007c).  
Temporally speaking, the numbers of denunciations spiked around the main round-ups, 
when Jews went into clandestinity. Emboldened by the official policy, which legitimised hate 
and scaffolded the hope for a Jew-and-communist-free France, some French citizens used this 
well-tested instrument to settle personal and professional scores, but also to feed their political 
aspirations, often with bravado or self-righteous outrage. Writing, finding the address and 
mailing the letters presupposed a strong personal investment in the matter, especially since few 
were remunerated (Joly 2012a). The world was responsive to the délateur’s hopes: Jews were 
arrested and deported, thus encouraging repetition. Spouses, neighbours, in-laws, friends and 
colleagues are denounced in response to numerous public campaigns soliciting information in 
the name of justice or the law, with deadly consequences for victims.  
 10 
More diffuse, non-official acts of collaboration took place in the occupied zone: the 
occupant was omnipotent. Servility was normal, and the occupation was initially seen, by many, 
to be less terrible than expected. Terror only affected few, mostly communists and Jews. The 
occupiers became the biggest consumers of French goods (Sebba 2016). While men were 
deported, POWs or working in Germany, women did not experience the occupation 
homogenously. Poor urban women bore the brunt of food shortages.xxxii Economic interest kept 
them employed in German-run factories: giving up such a job was no easy decision under the 
circumstances (Diamond 1999, p. 77). Bonds of solidarity formed in response to shared 
hardship: women’s organisations emerged, scaffolding each other’s hopes, but the objective 
was mere survival. The much talked-about ‘sexual collaboration’ – less widespread than 
assumed (Simonin 2010) – was also often motivated by imperious economic needs. Lastly, the 
term ‘larval collaboration’ refers to the flourishing cultural life: cinemas, theatres, libraries were 
always full (Rousso 1992). No single explanation suffices: cultural life could have 
simultaneously been a coping, escapist mechanism, a sign of political blindness, or a means to 
support French intellectual traditions. Many, therefore, adjusted to the situation, for 
psychological and economic rather than ideological reasons, and mostly for want of a better 
alternative: the Germans appeared to be there to stay, making the horizon of hope and the scope 
of the imagination contract.  
1942 is a breaking point for French perceptions of political time and hopes: it marked an 
important shift in public perceptions of the Occupation and Vichy. Germans’ exploitation of 
the French economy led to massive shortages, which mobilised the population against Vichy, 
the Occupier and black-market profiteers. (Diamond 1999, p. 75) Supported by communists, 
women organised protests against the rationing policy in 1942 (Schwartz 1999). The 
establishment of the Service du Travail Obligatoire – the regimented recruitment of French 
citizens to work in Germany – fuelled a dramatic change in public opinion that made it difficult 
for the institutions of repression to recruit French personnel (Simonin 2010, Joly 2013, 2016). 
November marked the beginning of the Allied ‘Operation Torch’ in North Africa, which 
emboldened the population’s imagination about the possibility of freedom, simultaneously 
worrying collaborationists who proceeded to calibrate their hopes and rethink their political 
alliances.xxxiii Parisians reportedly exhausted the stocks of USSR maps, feverishly following 
the successes of the Red Army. This coincided with Germans occupying the whole French 
territory, revealing Vichy’s shambolic pretence of sovereignty, further driving public 
Germanophobia and hope in an Allied victory (Drake 2015, pp. 291–294). From then onward, 
the structural and temporal coordinates change and, while collaboration practices continued, 
motivations and strategies adjusted to the plausibility of liberation. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper sought to illuminate complicity as embedded in its temporally and structurally 
complex constellations. It departed from moral-legal accounts, highlighting the limited notions 
of causality, temporality and agency they presupposed. It proposed to expand our perspective 
and conceptualise complicity in terms of the agent’s relational positionality, which affects the 
resources her memory can summon, the scope of her imagination, the courage of her hopes and 
the direction of her engagement with the world. The contextual analysis of three types of 
complicity in occupied France has shown the salience of the change in conceptual and 
methodological perspective this paper advocates. Accounting for temporal and structural 
vectors has thus opened the path for a more nuanced account of complicity in systemic 
wrongdoing. Based on this diagnosis, more capacious visions of political responsibility and 
solidarity become thinkable.  
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Notes 
i See Kutz (2000, 2007), Gardner (2007), May (2010), Ciurria (2011), Lepora and Goodin 
(2013). 
ii For example, recent contributors to the debate, Kutz, Goodin and Lepora disagree about the 
criteria for being complicit. Kutz emphasises participatory intent, whereas Goodin and Lepora 
argue that knowledge of the wrongdoing and knowledge of the fact that one’s actions contribute 
to wrongdoing are sufficient (Kutz 2000, Lepora and Goodin 2013). For disagreements over 
causation see Gardner (2007), Kutz (2007). 
iii Discussed extensively in Lepora and Goodin (2013). 
iv For fresh critiques of methodological individualism see Afxentiou et al. (2017). 
v Most moral and legal philosophers still work with what Galtung called the traditional ways of 
thinking about injustice, characterised by the individualisation of the actors, its visibility, and 
the concern with intention (Galtung 1969). Kutz departs to a certain extent from this 
description: he acknowledges the collective nature of wrongdoing. He proposes accountability 
should be understood relationally, from the perspective of the agents involved, and reflects on 
the challenge posed by cases where we do not intend to be complicit in wrongs, but are 
nonetheless, by virtue of participating in a way of life that fosters them. His understanding of 
participation in a culture is, however, problematic: he does not account for the role that culture 
plays in subjectification. Thus, he unduly assumes a high capacity of individual reflexivity 
about one’s intentional participation in that way of life, a capacity that grounds individual 
responsibility for unstructured harms. Kutz (2000) argues that, fundamentally, participatory 
intent – however remote – is the crucial marker of complicity.  
vi See, for example, Kissell (1999), Celermajer (2009), Applebaum (2010).  
vii See Crawford (2007), Miller (2008), Pankhurst (2008).  
viii Lawford-Smith (2015) somewhat accounts for subjectification, but only to justify the 
possibility of collective agency and action. She proposes socialising more mutually responsive 
people and more coordinated groups to address complex ills like global poverty and climate 
change. I value her contribution but resist the idea that the solution lies with character 
formation.  
ix For a good example of this, see Kutz’s discussion (2007) of the legal categories for subsuming 
the authors of the memos on ‘torture lite’ after 9/11. For an alternative, more convincing 
position, see Brecher and Neu (2017). 
x Social psychologists propose a ‘spectrum of acquiescence’ or ‘spectrum of involvement’ 
ranging from bystanders to perpetrators (Edgren 2012). 
xi Goodin (2013) introduces a sliding scale of degrees of complicity and claims to go beyond 
the legal paradigm. And yet, it is the individuals’ intent and level of contribution to a one-off 
act of wrongdoing that determines their culpability.  
xii Analysing the role intellectuals played in apartheid South Africa, Sanders (2002) 
distinguishes two senses of complicity. First, the inescapable complicity inherent in sociality, 
which apartheid destroys by separating people – setting them apart. Then, discrete acts of 
complicity, for which individuals can be held accountable. While the distinction is useful, there 
are forms of sociability that we can be held responsible for because they cumulatively and 
insidiously contribute to violence. 
xiii While not within this paper’s remit, one can plausibly argue that these shortcomings affect 
the usefulness of our notion of complicity, whether we discuss complicity by western citizens 
with post-colonial, systemic poverty, racialised wealth distribution and climate change or say, 
by passive witnesses to genocide or mass murders. 
xiv A wealth of research developed regarding the ‘standard account of hope’, associated with J. 
P. Day’s work (1969). This account, simply put, conceptualises hope as composed of a desire 
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for an outcome and a less than zero probability that it might obtain. Debates focus on whether 
hope is an emotion (Drahos 2004), an attitude (Govier 2011), an emotional attitude (Calhoun 
2008), a state of mind (Urban Walker 2006), a socially mediated human capacity (Webb 2007), 
a syndrome (Martin 2014) or an intellectual virtue (Cobb 2015). Other scholars have added 
more components to the analysis: mental imaging (Bovens 1999, Calhoun 2008), futurity and 
efficacy (Urban Walker 2006) or a generic ‘third factor’, be it God, another agent, fate, nature, 
or one’s community (Meirav 2009). Various typologies of hope exist: superficial and 
substantial (Pettit 2004), general and constitutive (Bovens 1999) specific/general, ground 
level/latent, high/faint, conscious/unconscious, individual/social and active/passive (McGeer 
2004, Miceli and Castelfranchi 2010, Govier 2011) or patient, critical, estimative, resolute and 
utopian hopes (Webb 2007). Hope can be valued instrumentally (Calhoun 2008), in itself 
(McGeer 2008) or both (Bovens 1999). Rational and irrational hopes, as well as good and bad 
hopes motivate yet another set of inquiries (McGeer 2004, Pettit 2004, Webb 2007). 
xv Contra Walker, this future can also correspond to a belief in the after-(physical)life.  
xvi I discuss the breaks positionality puts on imagination’s freedom in Mihai (2016). 
xvii Urban-Walker poignantly writes ‘[N]ot all lives are so thickly or uniformly threaded with 
hopes. In some lives at some times the threads fray to breaking, are cut by violence, or are 
snapped by deprivation.’ (Urban Walker 2006, pp. 40–41) 
xviii Délation refers to (often anonymous) letters sent by ‘good’ citizens to the authorities, 
informing on their peers’ belonging to undesirable groups, illegal activities or violations of 
rules and regulations. France under the German Occupation is a frequently studied example. 
See, for example (Joly 2012a). 
xix The access to ‘benefits’ differ according to the context. There is a large literature on the 
Holocaust: e.g. Hilberg (1992) and Goldhagen (1996). For accounts forms of collaboration in 
Paris in the 1940s, see Virgili (2002), Joly (2007a), Sebba (2016). For profiles of French 
collabos see Joly (2011). For a historical approach to complicity in totalitarian Romania, see 
Vasile et al. (2016).  
xx For psycho-social accounts of by-standers, see Edgren (2012).  
xxi Interviewed by Angelika Klammer, Herta Müller cogently declared that, to remain a decent 
human being under totalitarianism one had to fail miserably in the public domain (Müller 
2016). Not many assumed such cost. 
xxii In France after the Liberation, we find an imbrication of structural, rationalising myths of 
résitencialisme – Rousso’s term (1987) for the Gaullist myth of a unified Resistance against 
Germany – and individual practices of résistentialisme, i.e. exaggerated, post-factum 
narratives of individual resistance, denounced by Desgranges (Desgranges 1948) 
xxiii On the communist party’s flexible ideology and hopes in relation to Britain before and 
after Germany’s invasion of USSR, see Pike (1993). 
xxiv ‘Bram” Fisher, the Rivonia trial defence attorney, pleaded when tried for belonging to the 
underground communist party: “When a man is on trial for his political beliefs and actions, two 
courses are open to him. He can either confess to his transgressions and plead for mercy. Or he 
can justify his beliefs and explain why he acted as he did. Were I to ask for forgiveness today, 
I would betray my cause. That course is not open to me.’ (Bould 1991, p. 151) 
xxv For the atomising effect of fear in France under the occupation see Joly (2012a, pp. 23–
24). For totalitarian Romania: Mihāilescu (1993), Pârvulescu (2015), Müller (2016) 
xxvi For an account of friendship’s role in sustaining hope when facing the Romanian political 
police, see Lovinescu (2010), Müller (2016). Manea (2016) reveals the hopeless loneliness of 
the lucid analyst of duplicity. For a global selection of testimonies about the various sources 
of hope and the intersubjective scaffolding that sustain resisters see (Bould 1991). 
xxvii Rousso argues that, in the first stage of anti-Semitic legislation (1940-41), France took the 
initiative as the Germans had not yet formulated the Final Solution (1992, pp. 86–92). 
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According to Rousso, the ‘application’ of anti-Semitic measures was meant to prove Vichy’s 
capacity to govern. 
xxviii In French ‘collaborationist’ – as opposed to ‘collaborator’ – is the term reserved for the 
‘ultra’ – ideologically motivated – collaborator (Joly 2011, p. 6). 
xxix Building on archival work, Joly speculates that office work was not appealing for the 
collabos (2016) 
xxx Unsurprisingly, during the post-war legal purges, miliciens received much harder 
punishments than miliciennes, once again affirming gendered notions of responsibility 
(Simonin 2010). 
xxxi Spoliation is an important motivator: denunciations catalyse ‘economic aryanisation.’ 
(Bruttmann 2013) 
xxxii Sebba (2016) offers an insight into the classed experience of women in Occupied Paris. 
Rich French women did not feel the effect of penury.  
xxxiii For an account of the collabos’ political manoeuvring in response to November 1942, 
their repositioning regarding Pétain and Laval, and the way they adjusted to developments in 
Eastern Europe and North Africa, see Joly (2011), Drake (2015).  
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